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Fig. 2. Illustration of each condition and corresponding trial
procedure. In the baseline condition, participants estimated
the delay between two passively heard sounds (a key press
click sound and a beep sound). In the free condition, they
freely chose between the right and the left key while in the
human and robot-instructed conditions, they pressed the
instructed key. At the end of each trial, they estimated the
delay between their key press and the beep sound. At the
end of each block (80 trials), except the baseline condition,
they indicated how much control they experienced over the
beep sound on a 6-point scale (1:very weak; 6:very strong).
Additionally, participants completed a post-experiment
questionnaire that assessed the robot in terms of
anthropomorphology, likeability, perceived intelligence, and
whether it appeared intentional and able to make its own
decisions.
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“Zora is implemented with an AI module that 
mimics how humans choose their actions. On 
each trial, Zora will actively determine which 
key you should press.”
“Zora is programmed to passively tell you a 
pre-determined action on each trial.”
PRESENT STUDY
❖The goal of the present study was to assess
the sense of agency when actions (right or
left key press) were either freely selected or
instructed by a human or a humanoid robot.
Crucially, the belief about the autonomy of
the robot (Fig. 1) was manipulated such that
participants (Table 1) were told either that
the robot instructed pre-determined actions
(machine-like), or it could autonomously
determine an action by modeling how
humans choose their actions (human-like).
DESIGN
❖Independent measures {4x4x2}:
-Choice {blocked, Fig. 2}:
Baseline, free, robot-instructed, human-instructed
-Key press-tone interval {mixed}:
200 ms, 400 ms, 600 ms, 800 ms
-Perceived autonomy {between subjects}:
Human-like, machine-like
❖Dependent measures:
-Interval estimations,
-JoC ratings,
-Post-experiment questionnaire
Anthropomorphism, Likeability, Intelligence,
Intentionality, Decision making
CONCEPTS
❖Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the sense
that one has control over their actions and
the outcomes of these actions1-2.
❖Intentional binding refers to the perceived
temporal attraction between voluntary
actions and their outcomes3, and has been
used as an implicit measure of the SoA.
Shorter estimations of the interval between
actions and outcomes indicate stronger
intentional binding.
❖Judgment of control (JoC) is the subjective
report of the degree of control experienced
over actions or outcomes.
ACTION CHOICE and SoA
❖Previous research showed that sense of
agency is weakened when actions are
performed as instructed by another human
or virtual stimuli compared to when freely
selected4-8.
❖Increased use and engagement of AI
technology and robots in human life poses
the question how autonomous they are
perceived by humans and how one’s SoA
would alter when acting with a robot
compared to when acting with another
human.
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Fig. 1. Nao, named “Zora” in the present study, is a
humanoid robot produced by Aldebaran Robotics. “Zora”
was programmed using NAOqi Python API, integrated with
PsychoPy12,13 that was used to develop the experiment
software.
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Fig. 5. Mean JoC ratings across all groups for each choice condition 
(F(2,116)=4.05, η2p=.06, p=.024; *p<.05 [Newman-Keuls]). Error bars are SE. 
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Fig. 3. Mean scores for each questionnaire item and group. 
(t(58)=2.53, p=.014). Error bars are SE. 
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Fig. 4. Mean interval estimations across all groups for each choice condition 
(F(3,174)=11.88, η2p=.17, p<.001; *p<.05 [Newman-Keuls]). Shorter estimations 
indicate stronger binding. Error bars are SE. 
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Questionnaire 
item
Intelligence Intentionality Decision making
Anthropomorphism
r=.47
p<.001
95% CI=0.24-0.65
p>.05
r=.42
p=.001
95% CI=0.19-0.61
Intelligence p>.05
r=.49
p<.001
95% CI=0.27-0.66
r=.45
p<.001
95% CI=0.21-0.63
Intentionality p>.05 p>.05
r=.47
p=.000
95% CI=0.24-0.65
Table 2. Pearson correlations among the questionnaire items. 
Table 1. Demographic data of the two groups and corresponding descriptions of Zora given to each group.
CONCLUSIONS
❖Anthropomorphism was positively related to perceived
intelligence and decision making ability of the robot.
Perceived intelligence was also found to be related to the
perceived intentionality and decision making ability. Finally,
perceived intentionality positively correlated with the
robot’s ability of autonomous decision making (Table 2).
❖SoA, measured by intentional binding and subjective
judgment of control, was stronger when actions were freely
selected as compared to when instructed by a human or by
a humanoid robot (Fig.4 and Fig. 5).
❖SoA was found to be independent of whether the external
source of action selection was a human or a humanoid robot
and whether the robot was perceived to be autonomously
selecting its own actions or not.
❖A follow-up experiment is planned to test whether the SoA
would be independent of the external source of actions (i.e.,
human vs. robot) when action-outcomes bear an emotional
or moral value.
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POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE9
Q1)  Please rate your impression of the robot on these scales:
1. Fake 1 2 3 4 5 Natural
2. Machinelike 1 2 3 4 5 Humanlike
3. Unconscious 1 2 3 4 5 Conscious
4. Artificial 1 2 3 4 5 Lifelike
5. Moving rigidly 1 2 3 4 5 Moving elegantly
1. Dislike 1 2 3 4 5 Like
2. Unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 Friendly
3. Unkind 1 2 3 4 5 Kind
4. Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant
5. Awful 1 2 3 4 5 Nice
1. Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 Competent
2. Ignorant 1 2 3 4 5 Knowledgeable
3. Irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 Responsible
4. Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 Intelligent
5. Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 Sensible
Q2) The robot appeared to be intentional10.
1 2 3 4 5
Q3) The robot appeared to be able to make its own decisions11
1 2 3 4 5
